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Abstract
In a large-scale natural field experiment comprising 38,654 customers of a
renewable energy supplier in the United Kingdom, we randomize environ-
mental information and dissonance-inducing messaging to promote an active
switch from paper to online billing. We find that environmental information
and imagery is ineffective in inducing behavior change. Interestingly, the
dissonance-inducing messaging weakly improves uptake by 1.2 percentage
points among our main sample but backfires among a subsample of individ-
uals with doctoral educations, decreasing uptake by 6.2 percentage points
relative to a control group. Contrary to the majority of the literature on
gender and environmental behavior, females in our sample are less likely to
switch to paperless billing.
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1. Introduction
Businesses and governments are increasingly turning to randomized ex-
periments to discover means by which to increase profitability or pursue
policy goals. In a number of contexts, social and private objectives coincide,
creating opportunity for partnerships between researchers and businesses in-
terested in either or both of said objectives. Companies with clear sustain-
ability or corporate social responsibility objectives, or whose inputs to pro-
duction are both socially and privately costly, may be especially motivated
to identify cost-efficient means to improve their resourcefulness due to the
increased competitiveness and profitability associated with such innovation
(Porter and Van der Linde, 1995).
Behavioral social science research has paved a new path for governments
to identify innovative and cost-effective means of achieving desired policy out-
comes (Benartzi et al., 2017), and the private sector is increasingly pursuing
similar strategies in search of low-cost efficiency gains (e.g., Allcott, 2011;
Gosnell et al., 2016). Despite this growing trend, little research has been un-
dertaken to understand the resourcefulness of interactions between businesses
and their customers. How can companies maximize customers’ voluntary
participation in programs that increase the efficiency and resourcefulness of
business-customer interactions? As a means of improving operational effi-
ciency, the business sector has seen a rapid capitalization upon technological
advancements, such as mobile phone applications and SMS, or automatic bill
pay (ABP). However, encouraging or mandating enrollment in such programs
may lead to consumer welfare loss.
For instance, Sexton (2015) demonstrates that enrollment in ABP in-
creased average energy consumption by 4.0% for residential energy consumers
and 7.3% for small- to medium-sized commercial and municipal customers.
Thus, while enrolling customers in alternative bill pay schemes may decrease
transaction costs for retailers and improve resourcefulness, the act may come
at a cost in terms of customer satisfaction, convenience, financial awareness,
and ultimately retention. Similarly, while defaulting energy customers into
green tariffs increased adoption of such tariffs tenfold in a field experiment in
Germany, the ethical implications of such nudges in terms of consumer wel-
fare are highly debated (Ebeling and Lotz, 2015; Schubert, 2017). Instead,
companies may offer customers the option to enroll themselves voluntarily,
though status quo bias and potential costs (e.g., from increased consumption,
as shown above) suggest that many consumers may refrain from opting in.
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In a large-scale natural field experiment comprising 38,654 customers of
a green energy supplier, we investigate means to facilitate such cost- and
resource-efficient change without imposing the change upon the customer.
Specifically, we explore a role for targeted messaging to promote an active
switch to online (as opposed to paper1) energy billing in the UK, where
consumer research by a prominent consumer choice advocacy group has sug-
gested that many customers either have a preference for, solely have access
to, or may be harmed by involuntary discontinuation of paper billing (Keep
Me Posted, 2013). We implement a fractional factorial design, randomizing
(i) information on environmental damages associated with paper use and (ii)
messaging rooted in theories of cognitive dissonance, a phenomenon centered
upon a desire for consistency in self-perception, with (iii) vivid environmental
imagery. The research design rests on the assumption that the customer base
of Good Energy, a 100% renewable electricity supplier in the United King-
dom and our partner in this study, is characterized by high environmental
preferences. In light of the social mission of Good Energy and its customers’
selection into their customer base, we conceptualize a utility function charac-
terized by social preferences and cognitive dissonance, designing interventions
to manipulate these arguments.
We find that both imagery and information on environmental costs as-
sociated with the status quo are ineffective in increasing uptake of paper-
less billing beyond that of a control group. On the other hand, dissonance-
inducing messaging increases uptake among our main sample. Our data allow
for exploration of the roles of both gender and education, two demographic
factors that have been shown to increase pro-environmental behavior (Koll-
muss and Agyeman, 2002). We find significant heterogeneity of uptake, both
broadly speaking and with respect to treatment. Interestingly, dissonance-
inducing messaging backfires among our highly educated sample. To our
knowledge, this study is the first to demonstrate such nuanced heterogene-
1Excessive printing is costly from both a private and a social perspective. According to
Smith (2011), printing costs constitute up to ten percent of corporations’ revenue, and re-
ducing paper use by ten percent among U.S. corporations alone could prevent 1.6 million
tons—or 280,000 cars’ worth—of greenhouse gas emissions annually. Moreover, contin-
ued rapid growth in household waste is becoming particularly problematic, comprising a
majority of municipal solid waste globally (Briguglio, 2016).
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ity among a large and presumably educated sample.2 Additionally, the data
suggest that women are less likely than men to sign up to paperless billing.
Overall, the research suggests that individuals may be carefully targeted with
various forms of messaging to increase environmentally advantageous behav-
iors at no additional cost, and calls into question the general conclusion in
the literature that women are more inclined than men to behave in line with
social or environmental objectives (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Kollmuss and
Agyeman, 2002).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the
relevant literature and provides a conceptual framework of behavior that mo-
tivates the experimental design. Section 3 outlines the experimental design
and details the interventions implemented across Good Energy’s customer
base. Section 4 reveals the results of the field experiment, and Section 5
concludes.
2. Literature Review and Conceptual Framework
Economics research on household cooperation in waste management—
predominantly recycling behavior—has primarily focused on the role of con-
venience, incentives, intentions, attitudes, demographic characteristics, and
moral considerations (see Briguglio (2016) for a review). A vast majority of
this research aims to understand households’ waste-sorting behavior, with
very few studies focused on illuminating the determinants of waste mini-
mization. One example of the latter is a field experimental study on green
nudges to deter junk mail, which demonstrated that mandated choice is more
effective than active choice in overcoming status quo bias with respect to
placement of “No Junk Mail” stickers on mailboxes (Liebig and Rommel,
2014). Furthermore, with scant literature on the role of communication in
household waste decisions, there is a need for enhanced understanding of the
role of costly and prevalent communication campaigns in addressing waste
reduction objectives, as well as how these campaigns can be optimized for
effectiveness (Briguglio, 2016). We begin this exploration by reviewing the
relevant literature pertaining to the role of consequential information, cogni-
tive dissonance, and imagery in human decision-making.
2Prior studies have demonstrated that education leads to higher green energy uptake
(Jacobsen et al., 2013).
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2.1. Information provision
Neoclassical economics holds that individual decision-making derives from
rational maximization of one’s utility function with full information regard-
ing the potential consequences of one’s actions. Evolutionary and economic
theories—both within and outside of the utility maximization framework—
have posited that such decision-making processes incorporate altruistic pref-
erences, so that other-regarding considerations may play a role in decision-
making (Becker, 1974; Andreoni, 1989, 1990; Simon, 1993). Similarly, while
the rational economic man of neoclassical theory is primarily influenced by
incentives, social psychology and behavioral economics reserve a role for
nonstandard—e.g., non-egoistic, evaluative, normative, and identity-driven—
beliefs and motivations in dictating personal norms that, in turn, influence
behavior (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Elster, 2000;
Stern, 2000; Kollmuss and Agyeman, 2002; DellaVigna, 2009; Nyborg, 2018).
For instance, according to the norm-activation theory of Schwartz (1973) and
the value-belief-norm (VBN) theory of Stern et al. (1999), knowledge of neg-
ative consequences associated with one’s actions—or particular undesirable
conditions for which one is perceived to be responsible—spurs altruistic be-
havior. Therefore, information regarding particular externalities may change
individuals’ beliefs and intentions, in turn altering their proclivity to engage
in socially beneficial behaviors (Stern, 2000).
Empirically speaking—and despite the overwhelming tendency of social
campaigns to communicate information with the goal of changing behavior
(Bruvoll and Nyborg, 2004)—the impact of consequence-based information
on subsequent behavior is quite unclear, showing promise in the lab while
inducing mixed results in the field. Demand for such information is apparent
in the laboratory experiment of Cain and Dana (2012), where a significant
proportion (63%) of subjects chose to reveal the negative external conse-
quences of their actions when given the opportunity to either reveal or re-
main ignorant. More surprisingly, 24% actually paid to become aware of
such externalities. Of those who revealed, 44% and 50%, respectively, chose
the more altruistic option, whereas all subjects who did not reveal made the
selfish choice, consequently imposing a negative externality on their counter-
parts in the study. Remaining ignorant to the externality, therefore, allows
for justification of action solely upon one’s own private utility (i.e., without
regard for external costs).
However, interventions that impose consequence-based information in the
field have not always demonstrated such an effect. A meta-analysis of in-
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terventions intended to reduce household energy consumption demonstrates
that information regarding externalities may increase knowledge but does not
subsequently alter behavior (Abrahamse et al., 2005). On the other hand,
Ferraro and Price (2013) find that information on the extent and conse-
quences of water use among its (environmentally unconscious) customer base
increased the implementation of water-saving strategies, especially among
high-consumption households. Similarly, in a field experiment in Brazilian
favelas, Toledo (2016) finds that environmental persuasion increases take-
up of LED (energy-efficient) light bulbs by six percentage points (or 13%);
however, it is important to note that subjects were asked to participate vol-
untarily and therefore the findings may suffer from selection bias.3
The interventions discussed here are applied to individuals who do not
exhibit preferences for the environmental outcomes that constitute the fo-
cus of those studies. Yet, theory and empirical evidence to date suggest
that such preferences may be instrumental in determining outcomes. For
instance, in a Dutch mass media campaign surrounding the causes of and
possible behavioral solutions for climate change, individuals who reported a
higher willingness to engage in pro-environmental behaviors were those who
had already been behaving in such a manner prior to the campaign (Staats
et al., 1996). That is, information campaigns may be more effective in induc-
ing (intended) behavior change among individuals already motivated prior
to intervention. An important open question is whether environmental con-
cern is a prerequisite for informational nudges to be effective (Ölander and
Thøgersen, 2014).
3The consequences discussed here are externalities, or unintended costs of one’s actions
that accrue to others outside of oneself. Responses to consequence-based information in
the case of internalities are surprisingly weak. For instance, during well-child appointments
in a Norwegian experiment, parents were randomly assigned to receive short informational
briefings and brochures on smoking and its harmful passive effects on their children, after
which self-reported smoking behavior did not change (Eriksen et al., 1996). Similarly, sev-
eral field experimental studies demonstrate that information—including calories per item
and recommended daily caloric intake—has no effect on subsequent order choice in fast
food restaurants (Harnack et al., 2008; Downs et al., 2009). Likewise, an observational
study found that extreme media coverage of the consequences of Enron’s accounting scan-
dal on 401(k) holdings did not prompt employees in similar companies to diversify their
401(k) investments (Choi et al., 2005).
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2.2. Cognitive dissonance
Once social information has been consumed and acted upon, it may be
possible to create a virtuous circle by appealing to one’s established identity
with the cause (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000). Theories of cognitive dissonance
originated in psychology and have since piqued the interest of a number of
economists. The theories generally rest upon the premise that human beings
are averse to inconsistencies between past or current beliefs and behaviors
(Festinger, 1962). In a seminal experiment, Festinger and Carlsmith (1959)
demonstrated that individuals who completed an hour-long mind-numbing
task in the lab rated the task more positively if they had subsequently been
paid larger sums of money to convince new recruits to do the task. In general,
individuals strive for consistency, competence, and morality in their percep-
tions of themselves, such that behaving in a manner that negates these fea-
tures results in psychological discomfort (Aronson, 1992). Such ‘dissonance’
is morally costly, and economic agents may incorporate these costs into their
utility maximization problems.
According to Gilad et al. (1987), cognitive dissonance can manifest in sit-
uations in which “a decision is undertaken freely and with the understanding
of possible adverse outcomes” (p. 64). In their theory of selective exposure,
behavior remains consistent with traditional utility maximization if expo-
sure to certain types of information can be controlled and dissonance kept
at a level below some threshold, an assertion consistent with literature on
information avoidance (Cain and Dana, 2012; Golman et al., 2015). Oth-
erwise, the individual must adopt a costly change in her beliefs, and she
will subsequently maximize in accordance with a revised objective function.
Rabin (1994) proposes a similar structure for the utility function, adding a
more nuanced explanation of the contexts in which cognitive dissonance will
increase the tension between material benefit and psychological cost. For
instance, he conjectures that an individual who receives low material benefit
from an immoral activity will further convince herself of the immorality of
the activity than an individual who receives relatively high material benefit.
Interestingly, the author shows that a stronger proclivity toward cognitive
dissonance may pressure an individual with high material benefit from said
activity into changing her beliefs, thereby augmenting immoral activity.
A more recent interpretation of cognitive dissonance emphasizes the role
of context in determining the extent to which one may rationalize decisions
in light of one’s beliefs. Mazar et al. (2008) put forth a theory of cogni-
tive dissonance in which the propensity to engage in dishonest behavior is
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dependent on individuals’ mindfulness of and attention to their own moral
standards. In several laboratory experiments, they find that individuals who
have the opportunity to cheat do so, though they are less likely to cheat when
reminded of their moral beliefs or after signing an honor code. The authors
argue that the internal salience of self-concept is, therefore, an important
driver of congruence between belief and behavior.
Two economic theories formalize this human desire for internal consis-
tency. Akerlof and Dickens (1982) propose a two-period model in which a
rational individual first chooses whether to participate in a safe or hazardous
industry; if she chooses the latter, she will convince herself of the safety of
the industry so as to justify her past decision. In the second period, a cost-
effective safety device becomes available and the individual—who would have
purchased the device had it been available prior to her perception change—
continues to work without it.4 Similarly, Konow (2000) posits a utility func-
tion comprising material wealth along with two costly parameters: cognitive
dissonance and self-deception. The former characterizes the deviation be-
tween one’s beliefs and one’s actions—in this case, the deviation between
a fair allocation and one’s actual allocation in a dictator game—while the
latter captures the discomfort associated with altering one’s initial fairness
perspective to increase consistency between the aforementioned allocations.
Lab experimental results from several variants of the dictator game, where
subjects perform both active and passive roles, provide strong empirical sup-
port for both parameters.
Outside of the lab, social scientists have cited cognitive dissonance as
a plausible explanation for voting behavior (Mullainathan and Washington,
2009), investor inertia (Goetzmann and Peles, 1997; Rennekamp et al., 2014),
sexual risk taking (Mannberg, 2012), diminished labor supply in the face of
job search discrimination (Goldsmith et al., 2004), endogenous class forma-
tion (Oxoby, 2003), and honesty in the face of cheating opportunities (Mazar
et al., 2008). Furthermore, the phenomenon has been exploited as a means
to ends such as water use reduction (Dickerson et al., 1992), sustained weight
4According to the authors, the model justifies government regulation to mandate that
hazardous industry workers wear the equipment in order to return to Pareto optimal
conditions. While the model focuses on labor selection, it is also applied to explain the
effectiveness of non-informational advertising, the incidence of crime under various de-
grees of sanctions, and the necessity of Social Security for individuals who are averse to
acknowledging the inevitability of old age.
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loss (Axsom and Cooper, 1985), condom use (Stone et al., 1994), and reduc-
ing hypothetical bias in contingent valuation studies (Alfnes et al., 2010).
Perhaps most relevant to the present study, Kantola et al. (1984) imple-
mented a framed field experiment (N=203, out of 429 initially contacted)
where individuals who were reminded that they had previously expressed
agreement with a statement claiming that individuals have a duty to save
electricity reduced their consumption compared to a control group in a follow-
up measurement period of four weeks. It is worthwhile to note that subjects
were volunteers for the study who could participate only if they consented to
have their energy use monitored throughout the study period, and (strongly)
agreed with the statement, “It is your personal duty as a responsible citizen to
conserve as much electricity as possible,” opening the possibility of selection
bias and experimenter effects. Additionally, there is no mention of a balance
check across treatment arms, raising the question of whether the study was
truly randomized even within this self-selected sample. In a more recent se-
ries of field experiments on voting behavior, invoking the self-concept through
use of a noun identifier (“to be a voter”)—as opposed to a verb (“to vote”)—
in pre-election surveys significantly increased voter turnout, demonstrating
that provision of “positive self-regard” may substitute for recognition from
others for largely invisible behaviors (Bryan et al., 2011). To date, research
has yet to target self-selected groups displaying particular preferences with
dissonance-inducing messaging.
2.3. Imagery
Finally, a sparse empirical literature appears to suggest that imagery can
play a role in behavior change. For instance, a series of lab experiments
(Haley and Fessler, 2005; Burnham and Hare, 2007; Rigdon et al., 2009;
Mifune et al., 2010) and field experiments on honesty, littering, and donating
(Bateson et al., 2006; Ernest-Jones et al., 2011; Ekström, 2012) demonstrate
that an image of eyes can cause individuals to comply with cooperative norms
in some contexts. Additionally, money priming using imagery has been shown
to lead people to make less altruistic decisions or to focus their attention on
monetary features of products (see Vohs, 2015, for a review). Economic
theory has little to say on the role of imagery per se on behavioral outcomes,
though various types of imagery may serve to intensify emotions or increase
the availability heuristic (Loewenstein, 1996).
8
2.4. Conceptual Framework
In light of the theories outlined above, we hypothesize that consumers of a
renewable energy utility will respond to the experimental interventions below
with increased uptake of online billing. In line with norm-driven theories
from social psychology and theories of altruism from economics, we posit
that information on environmental damage may trigger motivation to act
altruistically if sufficiently strong. Additionally, subjects will respond to the
cognitive dissonance intervention by switching from paper billing to online
billing if the cost of induced dissonance sufficiently outweighs the perceived
benefits of paper billing (i.e., convenience to the consumer and the value of
expected energy savings associated with paper billing). We can conceptualize
these decision tradeoffs in a microeconomic framework by imagining a utility
function comprising utility from altruism and disutility from both excess
consumption (including energy costs) and cognitive dissonance. In line with
Sexton (2015), we assume that there is a weak increase in inattention to one’s
energy costs when switching from paper billing to online billing, reducing
households’ motivation to deviate from the status quo. The disutility arising
from reduced salience of energy costs—and consequent increases in energy
use—will be traded off with utility from consistency of self-perception (or
avoided self-deception, as in Konow, 2000). Similar utility tradeoffs exist
between increased energy costs and benefits arising from pure altruism or
warm glow (Andreoni, 1989).5
Finally, as an exploratory hypothesis in line with the conclusion of Tay-
lor and Thompson (1982) that vividness may be important in the context of
everyday informational competition, we conjecture that environmental im-
agery may serve to enhance the salience of the above interventions. Increased
attention would serve to augment the perceived social benefits or psycholog-
ical congruence of going paperless and, therefore, the probability of doing so
(DellaVigna, 2009).
3. Experimental design
We build upon the above literatures using a large-scale natural field exper-
iment (Harrison and List, 2004) to implement treatments that either appeal
5Households that switch may also derive utility from reduced waste, decreased storage
costs, or convenience.
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to an embedded environmental preference or that target a preference for con-
sistency in self-perception, with the aim of encouraging renewable gas and
energy consumers to switch from paper billing to online billing (i.e., a one-off,
low-cost behavior). We partnered with Good Energy—one of the UK’s lead-
ing renewable energy suppliers—to randomize email content in a campaign
to encourage 38,654 customers to switch from their current billing channel
(i.e., quarterly paper bills received via mail) to online billing (i.e., quarterly
bills received via email). As a business founded upon an environmental mis-
sion, Good Energy’s objective in undertaking the research partnership was
to achieve a switch rate as close to universal as possible; additionally, online
billing constitutes an operational cost reduction, as it requires fewer physical
and human resources than does paper billing. The six-week campaign ran in
September and October of 2014.
To investigate a role for consequence-based information provision in pro-
moting resourceful behavior, we provided customers with information on the
environmental consequences of continuing to receive communications by mail
(environmental framing). To understand the role of cognitive dissonance, we
promoted present decision making consistent with one’s implicit environmen-
tal identity by making this identity salient (cognitive dissonance), as in Mazar
et al. (2008). In contrast to Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), who claim
that cognitive dissonance contributes to status quo bias, we test whether
cognitive dissonance can be leveraged to mitigate against it. It is impor-
tant to note that environmental framing may also play a role in inducing
cognitive dissonance by making the individual aware of the external costs
of their current behavior; therefore, we do not measure a “pure” effect of
cognitive dissonance, but rather an “additional” effect of making such disso-
nance particularly salient. Finally, the design also allows for testing of the
importance of vivid imagery on customers’ decision making. The selected
imagery displays numerous bright green trees in a forest and was selected for
its bright, vivid aesthetic as well as its relevance to the environmental goal
of tree-saving.
The experiment rests upon the assumption that Good Energy’s customers
possess stronger than average preferences for environmental welfare. This as-
sumption is supported by the utility’s mission, energy prices, and customer
acquisition data. Good Energy’s stated mission at the time of the study
was “to keep the world a habitable place by offering consumers an active
role in addressing climate change.” It was the sole utility that sourced 100%
of its electricity from renewable sources. Additionally, while Good Energy’s
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prices are comparable with the Big Six Standard tariffs (i.e., those paid by
approximately 60% of UK residents), Good Energy’s customer base is over-
whelmingly comprised of consumers who are engaged in the energy market
and, therefore, actively switch. While Good Energy’s tariffs are in the 75th
percentile of available tariffs in its market, its customers pay a premium of
approximately 25% compared to the cheapest available tariff, suggesting that
their motivation is not strictly monetary. Finally, while Good Energy cus-
tomers’ consumption is quite similar to the average consumption in the UK,
they are primarily ‘ABC1’ (i.e., consumers characterized by relatively high
socioeconomic status, education, and income). Thus, their consumption may
be relatively low when dwelling size is taken into consideration, suggesting
energy consciousness.
3.1. Interventions
The subject line of each email announces the arrival of the online billing
(“e-billing” below) option, and emails are sent from Good Energy’s Chief Op-
erating Officer. The defining features of each email intervention are detailed
below.
Control (Groups 1-2). In the control email, the first line unveils the
online billing option (availability line hereafter, emphasis included): “It’s
finally here! Now you can switch to e-billing and have your energy bills
emailed directly to your inbox rather than receiving them by post.” The sub-
sequent line touts online billing access (online access line hereafter): “Even
better, you can access your bills online any time, so they won’t fill any valu-
able space in your drawers or bins.” Both of the previous lines appear iden-
tically across all interventions.
The key following control statement reads, “Here at Good Energy, we
prioritise customer satisfaction. The opportunity to switch to e-billing
is just one more step we have taken to keep you smiling.” Three benefits of
switching are subsequently listed: 1) Reduce paper waste; 2) spend less time
sorting through mail; and 3) access bills 24/7 online. The email includes a
link to make the switch, and all emails contain the same closing statement
followed by a signature from the Chief Operating Officer (for full email, see
Figure A1 in Appendix).
Environmental Framing (Groups 3-4). This treatment provides in-
formation on the environmental benefits associated with a universal shift
of Good Energy customers to online billing. Following the availability line
stated above, this treatment states (emphasis included): “If all customers
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make the switch, we would save 46 trees worth of paper each year!”
This line is followed by the online access line.
In addition to emphasizing Good Energy’s attention to customer satis-
faction, the next line also points out its commitment to the environment
(emphasis included): “Here at Good Energy, we prioritise customer
satisfaction as well as the environment. The opportunity to switch to
e-billing is just one more step we have taken to keep you smiling and help you
shrink your environmental footprint.” The subsequent benefits no longer ap-
peal to the customer herself, but rather are informative of the extent of paper
waste and its environmental costs. The first bullet states, “The average UK
family throws away 6 trees worth of paper in their household bin each year.”
The second pertains to the energy and climate impacts of the paper industry
as a whole: “Paper production ranks 3rd and 4th for most energy intensive
and greenhouse gas intensive manufacturing industries (respectively).” Fi-
nally, we provide aggregate paper use statistics for the UK: “12.5 million
tonnes of paper and cardboard are used annually in the UK, making us the
11th worst paper offender in the world.” The email closes as indicated in the
control description (for full email, see Figure A2 in Appendix).
Control and Environmental Framing (Groups 5-6). While the con-
tent contained in the above treatment email is roughly the same length and
format as the control email, it contains some different information. Therefore,
we also test whether provision of the environmental information (presented to
Groups 3 and 4) in addition to the control information (provided to Groups
1 and 2) is effective, allowing us to control for the otherwise non-incremental
change in content from one email to the next (see Table 1). All information
from both the control and the environmental framing email is aggregated
into one email (for full email, see Figure A3 in Appendix).
Cognitive Dissonance (Groups 7-8). Our final treatment quite closely
emulates the control email with the exception of a single line, so that length
and format are quite similar. Instead of emphasizing customer satisfaction,
this email appeals to one’s identity as a conscious decision maker (emphasis
included): “As a Good Energy customer, you are an environmen-
tal steward. By switching to e-billing, you take another important step to
eliminate the environmental impact of your energy use.” The remainder of
the email is identical to the control email (for full email, see Figure A4 in
Appendix).
Environmental Image (Groups 2, 4, 6, and 8). Finally, we test
the effectiveness of imagery—a central and customary component of Good
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Energy’s communications strategy—in capturing customers’ attention. For
each of the above emails, an additional intervention existed using the same
email content, but with the inclusion of a vibrant image of trees at the outset
(see Figure A5 in Appendix). That is, apart from the image, all other content
in the emails remained identical.
3.2. Sample
The main sample consists of 36,810 Good Energy customers, which is the
entire customer base omitting those for whom a working email address had
not been provided or for whom gender could not be identified. This sample is
47% female. The average customer had been with Good Energy for 315 days
and consumed 6450 kilowatt-hours (kWh) in gas and 3435 kWh in electricity
on an annual basis. Customers who were on a dual fuel account (i.e., who
have both gas and electricity accounts with Good Energy) comprise 41% of
the sample, while those with gas or electricity alone constitute 6% and 53%,
respectively.
A separate analysis is performed for those identified as either “Doctor” or
“Professor”—who are, therefore, gender neutral in the data—of which there
are 1844 customers (approximately 5% of the sample).6 Of these customers,
the average customer duration was 320 days, average annual gas and elec-
tricity consumption were 7592 kWh and 3546 kWh (respectively), and 41%,
7%, and 52% were on dual fuel, gas, and electricity contracts (respectively) in
2014. The difference in the two samples is significant for annual gas consump-
tion (p<0.01) and proportion of gas-only customers (p<0.10). We control
for all of the above observables in the analysis.
More generally, the customers of Good Energy are fairly representative
of UK households more broadly in terms of energy consumption and costs.
In our data, the average estimated annual energy consumption is 3668 kWh,
while the average UK household in 2014 consumed 4001 kWh. On the other
hand, Good Energy gas customers use slightly more gas (13,827 kWh) than
the average British household (12,404 kWh; Goodright and Wilkes, 2015).
Additionally, customers in our data likely pay similar prices per kWh. Due
to increased competitiveness of renewable energy in the UK energy mar-
ket, Good Energy customers pay a competitive price for their energy. On
6We are powered (β=0.8, α=0.05) to detect treatment effects of approximately 0.02
(approximately 15%) in the main sample, and 0.10 (approximately 25%) in the postgrad-
uate sample.
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average, while dual fuel customers of the UK’s largest (“Big Six”) energy
providers (i.e., those providers supplying over 90% of domestic customers)
paid approximately £1360 per household in 2013, Good Energy households
paid £1313. Similarly, compared to Ecotricity—one of Good Energy’s pri-
mary competitors in the UK renewable energy market—Good Energy dual
fuel customers paid £55 less per annum. Therefore, cost of energy does not
distinguish Good Energy households from other UK households.
3.3. Randomization
All observable variables in the dataset were used in the stratified random-
ization.7 Specifically, customers were sorted according to the fuel type associ-
ated with their accounts (gas only, electric only, or dual fuel), their estimated
annual consumption (partitioned into quartiles), the length of their contract
with Good Energy (partitioned into deciles), and the gender of the account
holder (male, female, unidentified). We first sorted customers according to
the three fuel types, and within each fuel type we blocked them according
to the estimated annual total consumption quartiles, creating twelve blocks.
Having sorted the data into these twelve blocks, we then sorted customers
in each block according to duration of existing contract with Good Energy,
followed by the account holder’s gender. If all blocks had contained at least
one customer, this would have created 12×10×3 = 360 blocks in total. How-
ever, there are nine blocks (i.e., combinations of the above variables used for
stratification) for which no customer in the dataset is representative, so the
stratification created 351 blocks in total. Once the data is sorted according
to the existing 351 blocks, a number (1−8) is assigned to each account holder
to allocate each customer to one of the eight treatments described above.
Since Good Energy’s email server was limited in terms of the volume of
emails that could be sent in one day, the trial was planned for six weeks. We
tested for pre-experimental equivalence across all group pairs on the above
7We perform the analysis with and without controlling for strata. Standard errors are
slightly inflated without strata, and we report these slightly more conservative estimates
(results controlling for strata are available upon request). Qualitatively, the results remain
entirely intact, which is unsurprising given the finding in Bruhn and McKenzie (2009) that
all randomization methods will achieve balance as sample sizes become large.
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variables as shown in the balance table (see Table 2a).8
4. Results
4.1. Treatment effects
In total, 13.42% of customers signed up for online billing. We first note
that imagery does not encourage adoption. In almost all cases, the email
without the image outperformed that with the image. While the difference
is not statistically significant when comparing all treatments without images
to all treatments with images (χ2-test; p=0.122), the difference is significant
when comparing the cognitive dissonance treatments with and without im-
ages (χ2-test; p=0.054). Thus, vivid imagery does not increase the salience
of the message in a meaningful way, weakly attenuating effects that appear
when the image is absent.
We therefore focus our attention in this section on treatment-control com-
parisons for interventions without imagery. Simple chi-square tests do not
reveal significant differences across treatments with varying messages in the
full sample (see Table A1 in Appendix). We do, however, detect signifi-
cant differences between outcomes in the Control and Cognitive Dissonance
groups within the main and postgraduate samples, which indicate oppos-
ing reactions from these stratified groups. To reduce variation and increase
power, we additionally investigate treatment effects using logistic regression
analysis controlling for a number of observables in our data. Our intent-to-
treat analysis considers a binary response variable; therefore, we report the
results of a logistic regression specification (in terms of both odds ratios and
average marginal effects9). The logistic regression performed is specified as
follows:
8We additionally test for balance within the subsample of Doctors and Professors in Ta-
ble 2b. We find slight imbalance on energy consumption between the cognitive dissonance
groups (with and without images; p<0.10) and imbalance between the control and cogni-
tive dissonance groups in the number of days they have been customers of Good Energy
(p<0.05). We provide regression results with controls—including energy consumption—
though the number of days a customer has been with Good Energy has no predictive
power in the model.
9Intuitively, the average marginal effects signify the average change in the dependent
variable if we consider a marginal increase in the respective independent variable for each
individual in the sample separately, then take the average of this marginal effect for all
subjects in the sample.
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logiti = α + βjTi,j + γXi
where βj represents the effect of treatment j ε{1, 2, 3, ..., 7} on individual i,
and γ represents the effects of a vector of control regressors.
Running the above specification, we find that receiving the cognitive dis-
sonance message (without image) multiplies the odds that one signs up to
online billing by exp(0.105)=1.107, i.e., increases the odds by 10.7% (or about
an average 1.2 percentage points increase in uptake10), controlling for con-
sumption, tariff type, and gender (p<0.10). However, including the image
appears to distract from the dissonance-inducing messaging, eliminating the
effect altogether (consistent with the the t-tests above). While the odds of
sign-up also tend to increase for the treatment groups containing environ-
mental information, we do not have sufficient power to detect such an effect
with statistical significance. Contrary to findings in the literature regarding
environmental behavior and gender (see Cheng et al., 2011, for a review), we
find that being female decreases the odds of signing up to paperless billing
by 26.5%. As shown in Table A2, this result holds if we run the regression
without treatment indicators within the control group alone (26.5% reduction
in the odds of sign-up, p<0.01); there are no significant interaction effects
between gender and treatment.
Additionally, it appears that those with smaller observed environmental
footprints are more likely to sign up to online billing. For instance, relative
to those on dual fuel renewable tariffs, the odds of signing up among cus-
tomers on either gas- or electricity-only tariffs are approximately 40% and
43% lower (p<0.01). Finally, for every increase of 1000 kWh in estimated an-
nual gas and electricity consumption, the odds of sign-up decrease by 0.004%
(p<0.10) and 0.014% (p<0.01), respectively. If we assume that being a dual
fuel consumer is indicative of higher environmental preferences than being a
single fuel consumer, and that lower consumption is associated with higher
10In other words, if we consider the effect of the cognitive dissonance treatment for each
individual in the sample separately—holding constant all other characteristics of that
individual—and then take the mean of these marginal effects across all individuals in the
sample, we see that the average marginal effect is to increase online billing uptake by 1.2
percentage points.
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environmental preferences, these final two results appear to imply that indi-
viduals with stronger preferences for the environment are more likely to sign
up for paperless billing.11
4.2. Treatment effect heterogeneity
Since we do not have gender data for the 1844 individuals identified with
the title of either “Doctor” or “Professor”, we run the logistic regression for
the two samples independently. That is, in the absence of an all-inclusive
continuous or categorical measure for education, we run the same regression
as in Table 3 exclusively for the “postgraduate education” sample (see Ta-
ble 4). Contrary to the main sample, the cognitive dissonance intervention
quite drastically backfires when we consider Doctors and Professors only,
decreasing the odds of sign-up by 43.0%. Again, provision of statistics on
associated environmental damage does not significantly affect the odds of
paperless take-up. Consumption does not predict behavior among this sub-
sample, while again being a dual fuel customer improves the probability that
the individual will sign up quite substantially (β=-0.081 relative to gas only
households, p<0.01; β=-0.054 relative to electric only households, p<0.05).
If we instead run a logistic regression on the full sample that includes in-
teraction terms between assigned treatment and a dummy indicating whether
the individual is in the postgraduate education sample, we find a similar
result (Table A3). On average, having extensive postgraduate education in-
creases the odds of signing up to online billing by 31.9% (p=0.141), increas-
ing uptake by almost 2 percentage points (p=0.025). Without controlling for
gender, the odds of signing up to online billing in the cognitive dissonance
(without image) treatment increase by 10.7% (p=0.096) in the main sam-
ple, while the odds decrease by 48.7% (p=0.023) for Doctors and Professors.
Thus, we find robust evidence that cognitive dissonance indeed backfires
among the highly educated, both in a regression with a stratified sample
of interest and in a regression using interaction terms among the full sam-
ple, suggesting a potential role for heterogeneous treatment of individuals to
maximize voluntary online billing uptake.
11The data do not include household size, income, or age, so consumption may also act
as a proxy for wealth, number of residents, or age (and therefore also potentially computer
literacy) as opposed to environmental preference. We are unable to make this distinction
using the data provided.
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4.3. Controlling for multiple hypotheses
Given that we test multiple hypotheses in this study—here, that we com-
pare more than one treatment to a control group—we use the LR chi-square
test to determine whether, in the presence of multiple hypotheses, we can
rule out the possibility that none of the interventions have an effect on up-
take. An LR chi-square test does not reject the null hypothesis of no effect
for the main regression specifications whose outputs are displayed in Tables
3 and 4. That is, the test discredits the finding that cognitive dissonance has
any effect on behavior in either sample.
However, focusing our attention on the effects of environmental informa-
tion and cognitive dissonance—i.e., in a logistic regression of uptake compar-
ing the control group to treatment groups 3 and 7, which test our primary
hypotheses—the LR test still does not reject a zero effect of the treatments
compared to the control group for the main sample (p=0.206), while it does
reject a zero effect of the treatments for the postgraduate education sample
(p=0.056). These tests call for caution in interpreting the above results, and
emphasize the benefits of pre-registering analyses.12 Regardless, the results
indicate at worst and demonstrate at best that there is likely an effect of
dissonance-inducing messaging on individuals’ behavior in the context under
investigation.
5. Discussion
In line with the literature, the results of the experiment indicate that
environmental information and imagery do not affect individuals’ propensity
to opt into receiving paperless communications, even among purportedly
green consumers. However, appealing to customers’ desire for consistency of
self-concept appears to hold promise, though doing so backfires among the
subsample with doctoral-level educations. Furthermore, our findings con-
tradict the general conclusion in the literature that females are more likely
12The goal of the study from an academic perspective was primarily to test the effects of
environmental information and cognitive dissonance on uptake. The inclusion of imagery
in the experimental design was a recommendation by the practitioners to test a commonly
used internal marketing strategy. A pre-registry would have prompted us to lay out
clearly our primary research questions of interest and designated all other hypotheses
as “exploratory analysis” to be excluded from the multiple hypothesis testing and main
conclusions, and to be included as additional analysis to inform future research.
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to engage in environmental behaviors than males. The results indicate that
informational campaigns are likely ineffective in promoting environmental be-
haviors, and that individuals with revealed altruistic preferences toward the
environment may be susceptible to messaging invoking feelings of cognitive
dissonance.
Given that the information provided is both easily available and free
to access, the null effect of environmental information speaks to many ex-
isting and emerging strands of literature on information and behavior and
holds a number of possible explanations. For example, the results fall in line
with the notion of information avoidance, where individuals actively choose
to evade information that might make them engage in altruistic behaviors
that they otherwise do not wish to perform (Cain and Dana, 2012; Golman
et al., 2015). A second explanation stemming from a phenomenon called
moral licensing suggests that individuals who “do good” along one dimension
may allow themselves to “do bad” (or simply not “do good”) along another
(see Merritt et al., 2010). Alternatively, perhaps the information is suffi-
cient to change beliefs and intentions (as claimed in Abrahamse et al., 2005),
though intentions have proven to be poorly correlated with behavior change
(Webb and Sheeran, 2006). Another possible explanation is that Good En-
ergy customers are already well aware of such information so that additional
information has little effect on their beliefs, in line with a diminishing re-
turns argument (Stern, 2000). Given that the information was framed as an
outcome of the actions of many customers, low expectations of others’ coop-
eration may also have diminished the effectiveness of the information in this
context, in line with research on conditional cooperation(e.g., Chaudhuri,
2011; Frey and Meier, 2004). Finally, it may be the case that the external
costs are simply not sufficiently severe to induce change, or that individuals
do not perceive their role in the problem as relevant (Biel and Thøgersen,
2007).
Moreover, the experimental results suggest that particular individuals
may be more or less susceptible to certain behavioral anomalies. In our case,
individuals titled “Doctor” or “Professor” are less likely to opt into online
billing if they receive the dissonance-inducing intervention as opposed to the
control intervention. One possible explanation is that individuals in the post-
graduate sample have higher cognitive skills, and that such cognitive skills
play a role in determining levels of experienced dissonance in the same way
they have been experimentally demonstrated to determine risk preferences
and impatience (Dohmen et al., 2010). A second explanation rests in line
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with the theory of Akerlof and Dickens (1982) in the sense that selection into
a green utility provider will solidify conviction of one’s own environmental
consciousness and will justify receipt of paper billing; when paperless billing
is subsequently offered in the second period, the individual has altered her
attitude toward the environmental harm of paper billing.
In sum, this research suggests that green businesses should consider aban-
doning the use of information regarding environmental externalities as a tool
to encourage environmentally beneficial decision making, especially since
shifting perceived responsibility for social outcomes from governments or
organizations to consumers may impose welfare costs (Bruvoll and Nyborg,
2004). Rather, they may appeal to their customer bases using more subtle
tactics rooted in the psychology of cognitive dissonance, with careful atten-
tion to the audience of the messaging. Indeed, there are many additional
strategies that could be equally—or possibly more—effective in encouraging
particular types of customers to continue to make decisions in line with their
past behaviors. This particular strategy may well generalize to other groups
of socially responsible consumers, such as donors to particular causes or vot-
ers who have historically engaged in altruistic or civic behaviors. Further
research should aim to gain a more nuanced understanding of the types of
individuals who may or may not be responsive to messaging that appeals to
desires for consistency in the self-concept in order to elucidate the underlying
drivers behind the heterogeneity of outcomes observed in this study.
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Figure 1: Online billing Uptake According to Group Assignment
Notes: The above bar graph shows the proportion of each study group that signed up to
online billing, with standard error bars.
6. Figures and Tables
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Table 1: Treatment Group Design
Control +
Environmental Environmental Cognitive
Content Control Framing Framing Dissonance
Availability and X X X X
Online Access






Notes: While the Control and Environmental Framing intervention simply adds en-
vironmental information to the Control email, the email doubles in length with the
addition. Therefore, we also include the Environmental Framing intervention that
is a similar length and format to the Control email so that we can ‘control’ for the
added complexity of including a large amount of additional information to the Con-
trol email. All even-numbered groups receive the treatment with the image.
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Table 2a: Balance Check: Full Sample
Image vs. No Image Control vs. Treatments
Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test:
Group 1 Group 2 1=2 Group 3 Group 4 3=4 Group 5 Group 6 5=6 Group 7 Group 8 7=8 1=3 1=4 1=5 1=6 1=7 1=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel 0.409 0.411 p=0.824 0.410 0.409 p=0.930 0.408 0.407 p=0.991 0.409 0.409 p=0.975 p=0.923 p=0.993 p=0.886 p=0.877 p=0.998 p=0.971
(0.492) (0.492) (0.492) (0.492) (0.491) (0.491) (0.492) (0.492)
Gas 0.062 0.062 p=0.949 0.063 0.061 p=0.628 0.062 0.062 p=0.967 0.062 0.062 p=0.943 p=0.762 p=0.856 p=0.934 p=0.968 p=0.947 p=0.972
(0.241) (0.241) (0.243) (0.239) (0.241) (0.241) (0.242) (0.241)
Electricity 0.529 0.527 p=0.803 0.527 0.53 p=0.748 0.530 0.531 p=0.975 0.529 0.530 p=0.948 p=0.809 p=0.937 p=0.919 p=0.894 p=0.972 p=0.985
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Gas 13.949 13.807 p=0.602 13.863 13.605 p=0.324 13.633 13.781 p=0.575 13.886 13.672 p=0.426 p=0.751 p=0.197 p=0.240 p=0.540 p=0.819 p=0.305
Consumption (9.352) (9.025) (9.038) (8.590) (8.757) (9.092) (9.284) (8.864)
Electricity 3.720 3.622 p=0.190 3.753 3.626 p=0.107 3.625 3.672 p=0.531 3.685 3.640 p=0.548 p=0.700 p=0.208 p=0.214 p=0.540 p=0.645 p=0.310
Consumption (3.845) (3.231) (4.162) (3.283) (3.419) (3.671) (3.419) (3.615)
Days as 314.8 313.9 p=0.887 312.1 313.3 p=0.861 317.4 317.2 p=0.977 316.7 318.8 p=0.770 p=0.681 p=0.815 p=0.709 p=0.733 p=0.787 p=0.573
Customer (333.9) (321.0) (327.5) (333.8) (338.3) (344.0) (342.4) (346.7)
Gender 0.469 0.468 p=0.952 0.470 0.471 p=0.907 0.470 0.470 p=0.991 0.469 0.472 p=0.677 p=0.937 p=0.845 p=0.897 p=0.906 p=0.949 p=0.792
(0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499) (0.499)
Postgraduate 0.045 0.046 p=0.860 0.050 0.051 p=0.830 0.048 0.051 p=0.446 0.046 0.045 p=0.677 p=0.330 p=0.234 p=0.622 p=0.210 p=0.820 p=0.850
Education (0.208) (0.210) (0.217) (0.219) (0.213) (0.220) (0.210) (0.207)
Sample Size 4817 4825 4834 4850 4830 4838 4825 4836
Notes: The p-values in the table derive from chi-square tests for comparisons of dummy and categorical variables and t-tests for comparisons of continuous vari-
ables. Group 1 (2) is the Control group (with image), 3 (4) is the Control and Environmental Framing (with image), 5 (6) is Environmental Framing (with image),
7 (8) is Cognitive Dissonance (with image). The table pertains to individuals in the entire sample, except for the following: gender balance tests are conducted
only for individuals for whom gender is identified, and balance tests on annual gas and electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume
gas and energy, respectively. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of fuel the customer receives from Good Energy, where “dual fuel” indicates that the
household receives both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption represent estimated annual usage values measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. Standard
deviations are reported below means in parentheses.
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Table 2b: Balance Check: Postgraduate Sample
Image vs. No Image Control vs. Treatments
Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test: Test:
Group 1 Group 2 1=2 Group 3 Group 4 3=4 Group 5 Group 6 5=6 Group 7 Group 8 7=8 1=3 1=4 1=5 1=6 1=7 1=8
Fuel Type:
Dual Fuel 0.388 0.422 p=0.475 0.413 0.400 p=0.710 0.391 0.385 p=0.881 0.433 0.449 p=0.735 p=0.595 p=0.864 p=0.945 p=0.938 p=0.337 p=0.198
(0.488) (0.495) (0.493) (0.490) (0.489) (0.487) (0.497) (0.499)
Gas 0.064 0.067 p=0.887 0.083 0.090 p=0.800 0.074 0.077 p=0.901 0.058 0.056 p=0.911 p=0.428 p=0.298 p=0.677 p=0.585 p=0.796 p=0.713
(0.245) (0.251) (0.277) (0.286) (0.262) (0.267) (0.234) (0.230)
Electricity 0.548 0.511 p=0.439 0.504 0.514 p=0.824 0.535 0.538 p=0.936 0.509 0.495 p=0.776 p=0.348 p=0.468 p=0.780 p=0.837 p=0.411 p=0.272
(0.499) (0.500) (0.501) (0.501) (0.500) (0.500) (0.501) (0.501)
Gas 16.736 15.542 p=0.409 15.829 16.178 p=0.806 15.463 15.479 p=0.991 16.257 14.977 p=0.317 p=0.526 p=0.697 p=0.348 p=0.359 p=0.728 p=0.182
Consumption (9.921) (10.777) (10.942) (10.988) (9.509) (9.998) (9.861) (9.006)
Electricity 3.898 3.766 p=0.672 3.827 3.627 p=0.498 3.673 3.840 p=0.567 4.422 3.499 p=0.068 p=0.825 p=0.342 p=0.452 p=0.849 p=0.262 p=0.275
Consumption (3.134) (3.208) (3.434) (2.748) (2.965) (3.138) (5.937) (4.169)
Days as 341.2 354.4 p=0.737 303.3 308.0 p=0.848 311.9 352.2 p=0.265 282.3 302.6 p=0.130 p=0.238 p=0.411 p=0.788 p=0.323 p=0.044 p=0.222
Customer (427.5) (396.7) (241.3) (289.6) (321.2) (451.5) (81.1) (182.1)
Sample Size 219 223 240 245 230 247 224 216
Notes: The p-values in the table derive from chi-square tests for comparisons of dummy and categorical variables and t-tests for comparisons of continuous vari-
ables. Group 1 (2) is the Control group (with image), 3 (4) is the Control and Environmental Framing (with image), 5 (6) is Environmental Framing (with image),
7 (8) is Cognitive Dissonance (with image). Balance tests on annual gas and electricity consumption are conducted only for individuals who consume gas and
energy, respectively. Annual estimated energy and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. The fuel type dummy variables specify the type of
fuel the customer receives from Good Energy, where “dual fuel” indicates that they receive both gas and electricity. Gas and electricity consumption are estimated
annual usage values measured at the unit of 1000 kWh. Standard deviations are reported below means in parentheses.
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Table 3: Logit Regression — Main Sample
OR Marginal OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.971 -0.003 0.968 -0.004
(0.060) (0.007) (0.060) (0.007)
G3: Env 1.017 0.002 1.018 0.002
(0.062) (0.007) (0.063) (0.007)
G4: Env, Image 0.997 -0.000 0.996 -0.000
(0.061) (0.007) (0.062) (0.007)
G5: Control Env 1.042 0.005 1.042 0.005
(0.064) (0.007) (0.064) (0.007)
G6: Control Env, Image 1.046 0.005 1.047 0.005
(0.064) (0.007) (0.064) (0.007)
G7: Cog Diss 1.105* 0.012* 1.107* 0.012*
(0.067) (0.007) (0.067) (0.007)
G8: Cog Diss, Image 0.964 -0.004 0.965 -0.004








Gas Only 0.597*** -0.050***
(0.043) (0.006)
Tariff:






Observations 36,810 36,810 36,810 36,810
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: The above logit regression pertains to individuals in the main sample. Annual estimated energy
and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
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Table 4: Logit Regression — Postgraduate Education Sample
OR Marginal OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.946 -0.007 0.929 -0.009
(0.245) (0.032) (0.242) (0.032)
G3: Env 1.110 0.014 1.10 0.012
(0.275) (0.034) (0.274) (0.033)
G4: Env, Image 0.992 -0.001 0.986 -0.002
(0.249) (0.032) (0.249) (0.032)
G5: Control Env 0.943 -0.007 0.936 -0.008
(0.243) (0.032) (0.242) (0.032)
G6: Control Env, Image 0.867 -0.018 0.869 -0.017
(0.222) (0.031) (0.224) (0.031)
G7: Cog Diss 0.582* -0.060** 0.570* -0.062**
(0.166) (0.027) (0.164) (0.027)
G8: Cog Diss, Image 0.917 -0.011 0.876 -0.016








Gas Only 0.446*** -0.081***
(0.137) (0.024)
Tariff:




Observations 1844 1844 1844 1844
Controls No No Yes Yes
Notes: The above logit regression pertains to individuals in the main sample. Annual estimated energy
and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
34
Appendix
Additional Tables and Figures
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Table A1: Proportion Signed up to Online Billing: Chi-Square Tests Comparing Experimental Conditions
Control and
Environmental Environmental Cognitive
Control Framing Test of Equality: Framing Test of Equality: Test of Equality Dissonance Test of Equality
(C) (EF) C vs. EF (CEF) C vs. CEF EF vs. CEF (CD) C vs. CD
Full Sample:
No Image 0.134 0.136 0.138 0.142
(0.340) (0.343) p=0.693 (0.345) p=0.539 p=0.826 (0.349) p=0.226
N=4817 N=4830 N=4834 N=4824
Image 0.130 0.134 0.138 0.129
(0.337) (0.340) p=0.624 (0.345) p=0.261 p=0.526 (0.335) p=0.893
N=4825 N=4838 N=4850 N=4836
Pooled 0.132 0.135 0.138 0.136
(0.338) (0.342) p=0.532 (0.345) p=0.219 p=0.546 (0.343) p=0.439
N=9642 N=9668 N=9684 N=9660
Main Sample:
No Image 0.132 0.134 0.137 0.144
(0.339) (0.341) p=0.781 (0.344) p=0.498 p=0.690 (0.351) p=0.098
N=4598 N=4590 N=4604 N=4600
Image 0.129 0.132 0.138 0.128
(0.335) (0.338) p=0.661 (0.344) p=0.221 p=0.433 (0.334) p=0.918
N=4602 N=4593 N=4603 N=4620
Pooled 0.131 0.133 0.137 0.136
(0.337) (0.340) p=0.612 (0.344) p=0.179 p=0.403 (0.343) p=0.398
N=9200 N=9183 N=9207 N=9220
Postgraduate Sample:
No Image 0.164 0.179 0.157 0.103
(0.371) (0.384) p=0.675 (0.364) p=0.820 p=0.512 (0.304) p=0.056
N=219 N=240 N=230 N=224
Image 0.157 0.163 0.146 0.153
(0.365) (0.370) p=0.852 (0.354) p=0.735 p=0.591 (0.361) p=0.904
N=223 N=245 N=247 N=216
Pooled 0.161 0.171 0.151 0.127
(0.368) (0.377) p=0.668 (0.358) p=0.686 p=0.394 (0.334) p=0.778
N=442 N=485 N=477 N=440
Notes: The table shows the results of tests of equality of proportion of individuals who sign up across experimental conditions for all subjects in the study sample,
where groups with and without images (e.g., G1 and G2) are pooled in the final row. Standard deviations are presented below means in parentheses.
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Table A2: Effects of Observed Covariates — Control
Group Only
OR Marginal
Electricity Consumption 0.993 -0.001
(0.007) (0.001)
Gas Consumption 0.985 -0.002
(0.014) (0.002)
Tariff: Gas Only 0.581*** -0.052***
(0.118) (0.016)







Notes: The above logit regression pertains to the individuals in the
control group (without image) of the main sample. Annual estimated
energy and gas consumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
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Table A3: Postgraduate Education and
Treatment
OR Marginal
G2: Control, Image 0.969 -0.004
(0.060) (0.007)
G3: Env 1.018 0.003
(0.063) (0.007)
G4: Env, Image 0.996 -0.001
(0.062) (0.007)
G5: Control Env 1.042 0.004
(0.064) (0.007)
G6: Control Env, Image 1.047 0.004
(0.064) (0.007)
G7: Cog Diss 1.107* 0.008
(0.067) (0.007)
















Gas Consumption 0.996 -0.000
(0.002) (0.000)
Energy Consumption 0.987*** -0.002***
(0.005) (0.001)
Tariff: Gas Only 0.605*** -0.050***
(0.042) (0.006)







Notes: The above logit regression includes all individuals
in the study sample. Annual estimated energy and gas con-
sumption are measured at the unit of 1000 kWh.
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Figure A1: Control Intervention
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Figure A2: Environmental Framing Intervention
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Figure A3: Control and Environmental Framing Intervention
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Figure A4: Cognitive Dissonance Intervention
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Figure A5: Email Image
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